Author: Charles L. Glaser
Publisher/Publication: International Security
Volume/Issue: 28 (4)
DOI/ISBN: 10.1162/0162288041588313
Abstract: One of the key texts in the qualitative study of arms races within the general Realist Paradigm, and especially within Defensive Realism. Charles L. Glaser distinguishes between two types of arms races: those that are dangerous and those that are not. The paper offers a new perspective for assessing the consequences of arms buildups by posing a different question: is an arms buildup the best way for a state to achieve security and to protect other vital interests? The paper also discusses the theoretical literature on arms races, which falls into opposing camps: (1) arms races are driven by the security dilemma, are explained by the rational spiral model, and decrease security, or (2) arms races are driven by revisionist adversaries, explained by the deterrence model, and increase security. The paper concludes that arms races can be dangerous if they are suboptimal and driven by the security dilemma. However, if they are rational and driven by revisionist adversaries, they can increase security.