Author: Stephen J. Majeski
Publisher/Publication: American Journal of Political Science
Volume/Issue: 29 (2)
DOI/ISBN: 10.2307/2111164
Abstract: The author in this paper examines the role of expectations in arms race dynamics, and argues that expectations of the opponent’s current and future military expenditures are important factors that influence the arms acquisition decisions of the participants. He develops and tests several models of expectation formation, such as extrapolative, Richardsonian, and adaptive expectations, using time-series data from six contemporary arms races. The results suggest that expectations and prior expectation errors do play a significant role in arms race processes, and that the races are asymmetric, meaning that only one nation reacts to the other. The author also discuss the implications of these findings for the security and stability of the regions involved in the arms races. Part of Majeski’s work on evaluating the Richardson model and reacting to the Wallace-Diehl Debate.