Author: Konstantinos Travlos
Publisher/Publication: All Azimuth
Volume/Issue: 8(2)
DOI/ISBN: 10.20991/allazimuth.477341
Abstract: The author looks at the role of military mobilization as a high-risk strategy by weaker international actors to trigger compellence by proxy against a stronger rival. In another name using military mobilization in order to trigger intervention by major powers or regional powers that then will impose a negotiated resolution to the militarized dispute that may favor the mobilizer. The study also shows how this strategy is high risk and can lead to inadvertent war, if it fails to trigger compellence by proxy, or the major powers or regional powers are opposed to the mobilizer. It derives a quantitative measure of mobilizations that are likely to be part of such a strategy and then conducts a qualitative analysis of such strategies in the context of the 1875-1913 Balkan crises.