Author: Andrew Kydd
Publisher/Publication: American Journal of Political Science
Volume/Issue: 44 (2)
DOI/ISBN: 10.2307/2669307
Abstract: The author in this paper presents a game-theoretic model of arms racing that incorporates bargaining, military spending, and war. The model is based on the deterrence model, which views arms races as symptoms of international conflict over political issues. The model shows that: 1) arms races arise when there is uncertainty about the economic capacity of states to sustain high levels of military spending, 2) arms control is difficult to achieve when there is a dispute that could lead to war and 3) arms races may reduce the likelihood of war by resolving uncertainty about relative power. Τhe author compares the implications of the model with those of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and the spiral model, which are more supportive of arms control. Finally, he concludes that the deterrence model provides a theoretically sophisticated alternative to the other models and has important implications for arms racing and arms-control theory. One of the key texts in the formal modeling approach to the study of arms races.